



with which a given set of inputs are used to produce outputs11 can be accomplished not only by innovation, 
but also by widening the dimensions of firms, through mergers, trusts, and every kind of agreement 
between firms. In Pantaleoni’s view, efficiency is the only explanation for firm conduct.  
A similar idea is expressed in his work on trusts and cartels (Pantaleoni 1909) where Pantaleoni 
distinguishes between what we now call horizontal and vertical integration. His paper is intended to 
demonstrate that while horizontal integration can indeed be a source of market power, vertical integration is 
only a way to improve x-efficiency. Moreover, he states that competition (or "selection", as Pantaleoni often 
calls it) endogenously determines the efficient level of vertical integration. Therefore, he is against what he 
considers “the persecution” of trusts made by American laws (Pantaleoni 1909 ed. 1925: 299).  
It’s interesting to notice that in his description of the competition process, entry always remains free: 
Pantaleoni does not even consider the existence of strategical or technical entry barriers. As far as economies 
of scale are concerned, he is aware that some industries can produce at decreasing costs, but he seems to 
believe that the minimum efficient scale cannot be but a low proportion of the total market demand. In his 
words: “if the industry is subject to the law of decreasing costs, all those who don’t produce at the minimum 
cost will be eliminated, and there couldn’t be extra-profits”. Moreover he explicitly says that “potential 
competition  […] is always a way to brake prices”. With this idea in mind, it's not a surprise that he was 
against antitrust laws, which he considers a useless Government intervention in the economic sphere. 
We can see that Pantaleoni is not worried that collusions reduce the number of firms in the market, 
widening their market shares. This view seems to be similar to that of the Chicago school. 
 
Conclusions 
De Viti de Marco and Pantaleoni were “militant marginalists”, they both introduced marginalism into 
Italy. In this paper we have pointed out that for them competition was a dynamic process, as it was for the 
Classical school, even though they were marginalists.  
The distinction between competition as a dynamic process and competition as a long -run, zero-profit 
equilibrium is always stressed in the works on the history of the idea of perfect competition (for example 
George Stigler 1957, Machovec 1995). It is common opinion that the Classical economists and Alfred 
Marshall dealt with the dynamic view of competition, while Cournot, Jevons and Edgeworth introduced the 
static notion of competitive equilibrium. 
I don't think that this distinction is relevant for the purpose of my research. My topic is not the history of 
the notion of competition, it is that of the notion of market power.  Market power is caused by barriers to 
entry. Freedom of entry is one of the four characteristics of a competitive market as it is described in the 
standard microeconomics textbooks. At the same time, entry is a dynamic, not a static concept. Hence, entry 
barriers are the cause of market power both in the static view of competition, as well as in the dynamic view 
of competition. For this reason, and as far as entry barriers are concerned, I don’t see any distinction between 
                                                 
11 Italian economists, from the Classics to the Marginalists, called the purpose of improving x-efficiency “the 
law of the minimum means”. 
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the Classical and the Marginalist paradigms. The distinction is relevant if the focus is on the history of the 
notion of competition, it is not relevant if the focus is on the history of the notion of market power. 
There is no surprise that in the works of Pantaleoni on this topic we find citations of Smith, Say and 
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